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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Theodore Edmonds, Lorenzo Duncan, Carlton Love, and 
Cora Love appeal from their convictions and sentencings after a 
jury trial on various drug-related charges.  The jury found all 
four appellants guilty of distributing cocaine and heroin, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and of conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine and heroin, in violation 21 U.S.C. § 846.  
Three defendants, Edmonds, Duncan, and Carlton Love, were found 
guilty of knowingly and intentionally using a communication 
facility in committing, causing, and facilitating the conspiracy 
to distribute cocaine and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 843(b).  Edmonds also was convicted of money laundering under 
18 U.S.C. § 1956, and of managing, supervising, and organizing a 
continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE"), under 21 U.S.C. § 848.  
On top of those convictions, the jury returned a verdict of 
  
$27,000,000 for the government against Edmonds, $4,500,000 
against Carlton Love, and $4,000,000 against Duncan under the 
criminal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853.  These appeals have 
been consolidated. 
 The appellants raise numerous issues, three of which 
present close and important questions warranting this opinion.  
The first concerns Edmonds' conviction on the charge of managing, 
supervising, and organizing a continuing criminal enterprise in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.  Following our decision in United 
States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988), we hold that 
the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to 
instruct the jury that it had to unanimously agree which of 
Edmonds' alleged drug violations constituted "the continuing 
series of violations" required for conviction on that count.   
 The second issue concerns the sentences imposed on 
Carlton Love and Cora Love.  Those two appellants argue that the 
drug quantities attributed to them for sentencing purposes were 
not justified by the evidence presented at trial.  We agree.  An 
appropriate drug-weight estimate will lower Carlton Love's U.S. 
Sentencing Guideline offense level; accordingly, we will remand 
his case for resentencing.  It is unclear whether an appropriate 
drug-weight estimate would change Cora Love's offense level, so 
we will remand her case for further findings and, if necessary, a 
reconsideration of her sentence. 
  
 The final issue involves the district court's admission 
into evidence of certain drug paraphernalia seized during the 
execution of a search warrant.  Carlton Love claims that the 
search warrant was issued on the basis of an affidavit containing 
information allegedly obtained in violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights.  We find no Fourth Amendment violation and 
accordingly cannot fault the challenged evidentiary ruling. 
 
  
 I. 
 This case involves a large conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine and heroin through the Federal Express system.  The 
conspirators, for over a year, would ship drugs from the Los 
Angeles area via Federal Express to points in the East Coast and 
Midwest.  Various members of the conspiracy then would distribute 
the drugs, collect money in return, and ship the money received 
back to California, again using Federal Express.  Headed by 
Edmonds, the conspiracy sold more than 1500 kilograms of cocaine 
and more than 2 kilograms of heroin to distributors in Chester, 
Pennsylvania; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Wilmington, Delaware; 
Wilmington, North Carolina; Detroit, Michigan; New Orleans, 
Louisiana; Toledo, Ohio; and elsewhere. 
 Edmonds arranged the drug shipments from the Los 
Angeles area with the help of codefendant Reinard Mozell and one 
or two others.  Tyria H. Ekwensi managed the distribution 
operation for the East Coast and the Detroit area.  During the 
early part of the conspiracy, Edmonds would send shipments to 
Ekwensi's address in Mount Laurel, New Jersey.  Ekwensi passed 
the drugs on to Duncan, her sole distributor at that time, who 
then sold the drugs on consignment.  As the conspiracy 
progressed, Ekwensi also began to distribute the drugs to Russell 
Freeman, Jr. and to Carlton Love.  At one point, Edmonds started 
to send the shipments directly to addresses provided by both 
Duncan and Freeman, Jr., as well as Ekwensi. 
  
 During the early part of these operations, Ekwensi 
would secret monies received from selling the drugs on her person 
and personally deliver the money to Edmonds in California.  
Edmonds eventually changed that procedure and Ekwensi proceeded 
to send packages of money by Federal Express to various Edmonds-
controlled Los Angeles-area addresses.  Carlton Love, Duncan, and 
Freeman, Jr. assisted Ekwensi with preparing the money for 
shipment and delivering the boxes to Federal Express.   
 The scheme began to unravel when a Federal Express 
employee at the Philadelphia airport became suspicious of a 
package that had been presented for shipment to the Los Angeles 
area.  He opened the package and discovered that it contained a 
large amount of currency.  Shortly thereafter, the same Federal 
Express employee noticed a similar package.  He alerted the 
Federal Express security department, which in turn alerted law 
enforcement authorities.  The package was searched and found to 
contain approximately $200,000 in cash. 
 In the course of the next several months, the FBI 
checked Federal Express records and seized a number of Federal 
Express packages containing cash sent from the Philadelphia area 
to the Los Angeles area as well as a number packages containing 
drugs sent from the Los Angeles area to the Philadelphia area.  
On May 29, 1992, the government secured the first of a series of 
wire and electronic communications warrants on telephones 
subscribed to or used by subjects of the investigation.  The 
  
wiretaps led to seizures and physical surveillance.  This 
evidence, coupled with the ultimate cooperation of a number of 
the suspects of the investigation, led to the indictment of 
sixteen individuals, some from the Los Angeles area and others 
from the Philadelphia area.  Ekwensi and Mozell testified for the 
government at trial. 
 The appellants were tried, convicted and sentenced in 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
We have jurisdiction to hear these appeals under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1291. 
 
 II. 
 The jury found Edmonds guilty of managing, supervising, 
or organizing five or more persons in a continuing criminal 
enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.1  Edmonds gives two 
                     
1
.  Section 848(a)(1) makes it a crime to engage in a "continuing 
criminal enterprise."  Section 848(b) provides that a person 
engages in a "continuing criminal enterprise if -- 
 
     (1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or              
subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is a        
felony, and 
 
     (2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of           
violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of this  
   chapter -- 
  (A) which are undertaken by such person 
in concert with five or more other persons 
with respect to whom such person occupies a 
position of organizer, a supervisory 
position, or any other position of 
management, and 
 
  
reasons why that conviction should be reversed.  His first is 
that the government failed to meet the statute's "numerosity" 
requirement; that is, he contends that the government failed to 
prove that he managed, supervised, or organized five or more 
people in connection with the underlying drug felonies.  Our 
examination of the record reveals that there in fact was 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that Edmonds managed, 
supervised, or organized five or more people in connection with 
the underlying drug felonies. 
 Edmonds' second reason for challenging his CCE 
conviction is more substantial.  He contends that the trial court 
erroneously refused to instruct the jury that it had to 
unanimously agree which of the alleged violations constituted the 
"continuing series of violations" required for a conviction on 
the CCE charge.  We agree that the trial court's refusal to give 
such an instruction requires a reversal of Edmonds' conviction on 
the CCE charge. 
 
 A. 
 To obtain a conviction under the continuing criminal 
enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848, the government must prove 
that the defendant, through his or her supervisory role over a 
criminal enterprise of five or more others, is criminally 
(..continued) 
  (B) from which such person obtains 
substantial income or resources."  
  
responsible for a "continuing series" of felony violations of the 
federal narcotics laws.  A "series" in this context is 
established by proof of three or more violations.  See United 
States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 642-43 (3d Cir. 1988).  
"Continuing," on the other hand, means that the three violations 
must somehow be related; it is well-established, for example, 
that clearly "isolated," and accordingly unrelated, violations of 
the federal drug laws will not support a CCE conviction.  United 
States v. Jones, 801 F.2d 304, 307 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that 
three separate, unrelated, drug sales would not establish a 
continuing series); see also United States v. Baker, 905 F.2d 
1100, 1104 (7th Cir.) (stating that "an unrelated conspiracy does 
not count [for CCE purposes] because it cannot be part of the 
'continuing' series"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 876, and cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 904 (1990), and cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1030 
(1991).  Furthermore, the law is clear that the "continuing 
series" requirement is an element of the crime.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(stating that the government must prove that a felony violation 
of the narcotics law is "part of a continuing series of 
violations"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054, and cert. denied, 481 
U.S. 1018 (1987).  As a result, to convict, a jury must agree 
unanimously that the defendant committed a continuing series of 
three drug-related criminal offenses.  See, e.g., In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
  
 The district court in this case instructed the jury 
that "[a] continuing series of violations requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that three or more violations occurred and that 
they, those three or more, were related to each other."  Edmonds 
asked the district court to explain to the jury that it must 
unanimously agree which three of any narcotics violations they 
found to have occurred were related to each other for the 
purposes of the "continuing series" requirement.  The district 
court declined to so instruct the jury, and Edmonds insists that 
this was reversible error.   
  The defendant in Echeverri also was charged with a CCE 
offense.  He requested the following jury instruction: 
 The second element the government must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt is that this 
offense was part of a continuing series of 
violations of the federal narcotics laws.  A 
continuing series of violations is three or 
more violations of the federal narcotics laws 
committed over a definite period of time. 
 You must unanimously agree on which three 
acts constitute the continuing series of 
violations. 
 
Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 642.  We held that it was reversible error 
for the district court to decline to give this or a similar 
instruction.  We explained: 
 In the absence of a specific unanimity 
instruction directed to the government's 
several claims, it was apparent that the jury 
need not have unanimously agreed that any 
particular criminal act had been committed by 
the defendant.  
 
 * * * * 
  
  
 Here, the jury was instructed that the 
continuing series element required them to 
find three violations of the drug laws . . ., 
yet as a result of the district court's 
refusal to give the requested instruction, 
there is no assurance that the jury 
unanimously agreed that the same narcotics 
violations occurred. 
 
Id. at 642-43. 
 There is a difference between the facts of this case 
and those presented in Echeverri.  The jury convicted Edmonds of 
each of the eight substantive counts involving the drug felonies 
alleged to constitute the continuing series.  As a matter of 
logic, therefore, the jurors must have unanimously agreed that 
Edmonds committed every felony in the alleged "series."  Thus, 
the government maintains, the principles requiring a reversal in 
Echeverri do not require a reversal in this case. 
 This misunderstands Edmonds' argument.  Edmonds does 
not dispute that the jury unanimously found he committed every 
one of the eight underlying narcotics violations.  His argument 
instead is that the instruction given by the trial court did not 
require the jury to unanimously agree that the same three or more 
violations were "related" to each other for the purposes of the 
CCE statute.  He thus contends that the mere fact that the jury 
returned a guilty verdict on the substantive counts involving the 
eight underlying offenses does not, by itself, establish that the 
jury found that the eight offenses, or any particular subset of 
three or more of the eight offenses, were related to each other. 
  
 It is possible, as Edmonds insists, that the jury, 
while finding that all eight violations occurred, did not 
actually agree on which violations were related to each other.  
For example, six jurors could have felt that violations A, B, and 
C (but no others) were related and the other six jurors could 
have concluded that D, E, and F (but no others) were related.  
Thus, as in Echeverri, it is possible that the jurors failed to 
unanimously agree that Edmonds was responsible for three related 
criminal acts and that the government therefore failed to meet 
its burden of proving a "continuing series" of violations. 
 
 B. 
 The government maintains that United States v. Jackson, 
879 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1989), requires that we affirm Edmonds' CCE 
conviction.  The defendant in Jackson, who was also charged with 
a CCE offense, claimed that the jurors had to decide unanimously 
on the identities of his five underlings before they could 
conclude that the government had met its burden of showing that 
he acted in a "supervisory role."  We agreed with the defendant 
that whether there were five or more underlings was in fact an 
essential element of the offense and that the jury accordingly 
had to reach a consensus on that fact.  Id. at 88.  We 
nevertheless rejected the notion that the jury must unanimously 
agree on the identities of the five underlings.  Id. 
  
 The result in Jackson follows from the general rule 
that jurors need not be in "complete agreement as to the 
collateral or underlying facts which relate to the manner in 
which the culpable conduct was undertaken."  Id. (emphasis 
added); see generally Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-37 
(1991) (noting that the Constitution does not require jurors to 
"agree upon a single means of commission"); Griffin v. United 
States, 502 U.S. 46, 49-57 (1991).  The elements of the crime 
proscribed by § 848, as viewed by the court in Jackson, are that 
(1) the defendant committed three drug felonies, and (2) each of 
those felonies were (a) related to each other, (b) undertaken in 
concert with five or more people whom the defendant organized or 
managed, and (c) produced substantial income or resources for the 
defendant.  Satisfaction of element (2)(b) requires proof that a 
group of a certain size be involved in the commission of the 
felony.  The identities of the people making up the group of 
underlings for the purposes of the CCE statute merely relate to 
the manner in which the culpable conduct is undertaken, however.  
Put simply, the CCE statute does not care who the five people 
are, it only cares that the jurors agreed on the essential facts 
of "whether the requisite size and level of control existed."  
Jackson, 879 F.2d at 89; see also United States v. Bafia, 949 
F.2d 1465, 1471 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that it is not necessary 
that the same five people be involved when each of the criminal 
acts constituting the series is committed). 
  
 Under traditional principles of our criminal 
jurisprudence, the legislature, within constitutional limits not 
here implicated, can define a crime as it chooses.  Schad, 501 
U.S. at 632-37.  Once the elements have been described, however, 
each must be proved to a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 642-43.  When a statute makes it a 
crime to engage in particular conduct on a single occasion and a 
jury unanimously agrees that a single event occurred involving 
conduct of the defendant and a state of mind that fit the 
statutory definition of the offense, we do not insist that the 
jury unanimously agree on the precise manner in which the offense 
was committed.  The same analysis applies when the crime charged 
involves a series of events.  When a jury unanimously agrees that 
a single set of events occurred involving actions of the 
defendant and a state of mind that fit the statutory definition 
of the offense, we do not insist that the jury unanimously agree 
on the manner in which the offense was committed.  Thus, in 
Jackson, the jury unanimously agreed that a single set of events 
occurred and that individually and collectively those events fell 
within the statutory definition: the defendant participated in 
each event, each event was a violation of a controlled substance 
statute, each was related to two or more other such violations, 
each was engaged in by the defendant through an organization of 
the requisite size, and each produced substantial gain for the 
defendant.  This was sufficient.  It was not necessary that the 
  
jury unanimously agree as to the identities of the five 
underlings in each instance. 
 Here we have quite a different situation.  We do not 
know that the jury unanimously agreed that Edmonds participated 
in a single set of events that met all of the elements of the 
statutory definition.  Because no event can meet the statutory 
criteria unless the distribution involved was related to two or 
more other distributions, the district court's charge leaves us 
without the requisite assurance that no juror had a reasonable 
doubt concerning Edmonds' guilt of the CCE charge.  A juror may 
have had a reasonable doubt about the "relatedness" of one or 
more of the events that his or her colleagues thought constituted 
a series of three related drug offenses. 
 Thus, Jackson is inapposite here.  To apply Jackson in 
this context would be to disregard as irrelevant the portions of 
the CCE statute requiring that the underlying criminal acts be of 
a particular character, i.e., that they be related.  That is 
precisely the result we rejected in Echeverri.  The required 
underlying criminal acts, including their "relatedness," are 
"facts necessary to constitute the crime" -- not merely 
immaterial means -- and therefore must be proven individually.  
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  Consistent with 
Jackson, the jury need not agree on how the three violation 
events were related, but they must agree that the defendant 
participated in three specific events and that those events were 
  
related.  Not requiring unanimity on which three or more criminal 
acts are related leaves open the possibility that Edmonds could 
have been convicted without unanimous juror agreement that he 
engaged in a "continuing series" of criminal acts, that is, 
without unanimous agreement that he committed the crime charged. 
 We are aware that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has declined to follow our decision in Echeverri.  
United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 947-48 (7th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1701, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940, 
and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1954 (1992).  The court there argued 
that the result in Echeverri "is at odds with the purpose of the 
[CCE statute] which is interested in punishing a defendant whom 
the jury is convinced was involved in a related series of drug 
activity with relevant frequency.  It is the defendant's 
demonstrated frequency in participating in conspiratorial drug 
offenses that is the focus of the [CCE] offense, rather than any 
particularization of the acts used to demonstrate 'continuous.'"  
Id. at 948 n.7.   
 We respectfully disagree with the Seventh Circuit's 
analysis.  Implicit in its approach is the view that the 
predicate offenses making up a "continuous series" of violations 
and their "relatedness," like the identities of the underlings, 
are immaterial "means" and not material elements of the crime 
requiring specific juror agreement.  The court reasoned, for 
example, that "the exact specification by unanimous jury consent 
  
of any particular three of a greater number of offenses is 
irrelevant to any theory about why punishment should be enhanced 
for such uniquely antisocial activity."  Id. at 948.  We believe 
Congress drafted the CCE statute as it did because it regarded 
the existence of a series of related offenses as material to 
whether the substantially enhanced punishment there provided is 
appropriate.  Moreover, in the absence of evidence that Congress 
intended to depart from the traditional approach of our criminal 
jurisprudence, we decline to attribute to it an intent that this 
enhanced punishment be visited on a defendant where the jury is 
unable to agree beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
participated in three specific events constituting such a series. 
 The relevant point is not, as the Seventh Circuit views 
it, whether a person who commits three related drug violations 
with the requisite sized group on May 12th, 13th, and 14th of a 
given year is as culpable as if he or she commits similar 
violations with the requisite sized group on June 12th, 13th, and 
14th.  The relevant point is that a person cannot be held 
criminally responsible if half of the jury believes the defendant 
committed the conduct described by the statute on May 12th, 13th, 
and 14th, but not in June, and the other half believes the 
defendant committed the conduct described by the statute on June 
12th, 13th, and 14th, but not in May.  Cf. Schad, 501 U.S. at 651 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "moral equivalence" would 
not justify upholding an assault conviction where a portion of 
  
the jury may have believed the defendant assaulted X on Tuesday, 
while the other half may have believed the defendant assaulted Y 
on Wednesday). 
 This case is governed by Echeverri and its forbearers,2 
not Jackson.  We are confronted here with a situation in which 
the trial court correctly charged that a "continuing series," 
that is, "three or more violations . . . related to each other," 
was an element of the offense and that the jury must unanimously 
agree on each element of the offense.  However, the trial court 
failed to further explain what unanimity meant in this context.  
Although this may not have been plain error had Edmonds not 
requested a more specific explanation, he did so request.3   
 
 C. 
 That the trial court erred in not giving the 
appropriate unanimity instruction does not end our inquiry, 
however.  We still must determine whether we could affirm 
Edmonds' CCE conviction on the ground that the failure to give 
                     
2
.  E.g., United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1987). 
3
.  In United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171 (3d Cir. 1988), 
we held that the failure to give a further explanation in a 
similar situation in the absence of a request was not plain 
error.  The appellant did not make the same argument made here 
about the requirement of relatedness.  Rather, he complained 
about the failure to instruct specifically that three criminal 
acts were required and that the jury had to unanimously agree on 
which three criminal acts occurred.  We found that the district 
court erred but that its error did not result in plain error 
because the jury unanimously found the appellant guilty of three 
counts of distribution and one count of conspiracy.  Id. at 1175. 
  
the proper instruction was harmless error.  Given the evidence in 
this case, it is difficult to believe that a rational jury who 
was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Edmonds committed 
all eight of the violations alleged to constitute the "continuing 
series," would then have failed to conclude that each and every 
one of those acts were related.  The evidence that the jury must 
have credited to convict Edmonds of the eight crimes alleged to 
constitute the series established that there was a single, on-
going scheme and that Edmonds used the same packers and method of 
distribution throughout the relevant period.  Nevertheless, 
we conclude that the Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993), precludes us from engaging in 
a harmless error analysis. 
 Sullivan concerned the propriety of appellate courts 
engaging in harmless error analysis where the jury instructions 
gave an unconstitutional definition of reasonable doubt.4  The 
Court ruled that permitting harmless error analysis in that 
                     
4
.  The trial judge in Sullivan gave a definition of reasonable 
doubt essentially identical to the definition the Supreme Court 
had held unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 
(1990) (per curiam).  The charge held unconstitutional in Cage 
explained that reasonable doubt "must be such doubt as would give 
rise to grave uncertainty . . . .  It is an actual substantial 
doubt. . . .  What is required is not an absolute or mathematical 
certainty, but a moral certainty."  Id. at 40.  The Court in Cage 
ruled that given this instruction "a reasonable juror could have 
interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on 
a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause."  
Id. at 41. 
 
  
situation would violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial.  It explained: 
 Since [the jury never found the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,] there has 
been no jury verdict within the meaning of 
the Sixth Amendment [and] the entire premise 
of Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 
(1967),] review is simply absent.  There 
being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt, the question whether the 
same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt would have been rendered absent the 
constitutional error is utterly meaningless.  
There is no object so to speak, upon which 
harmless error scrutiny can operate.  The 
most an appellate court can conclude is that 
a jury would surely have found petitioner 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt -- not that 
the jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt would surely not have been 
different absent the constitutional error.  
 . . .  The Sixth Amendment requires more than 
appellate speculation about a hypothetical 
jury's action, or else directed verdicts for 
the State would be sustainable on appeal; it 
requires an actual jury finding of guilty. 
 
Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2082. 
 The relatedness requirement is an element of the CCE 
offense.  Accordingly, the government was required to prove, and 
the jury was required to unanimously find, relatedness beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2080.  The jury 
instruction in this case therefore permitted the jury to return a 
nonunanimous verdict on an element of the offense.  Thus, as in 
Sullivan, there has been no actual jury finding of guilty on the 
CCE charge against Edmonds.  Under Sullivan, we cannot rule that 
  
the error was harmless.5  It follows that Edmonds' CCE conviction 
must be reversed. 
 
 III. 
 Carlton Love and Cora Love maintain that the trial 
court improperly attributed to them for sentencing purposes a 
larger quantity of narcotics than was justified by the trial 
evidence.  When reviewing a district court's sentencing 
decisions, a court of appeals has plenary review over legal 
questions about the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines.  United 
States v. Fuentes, 954 F.2d 151, 152-53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 2950 (1992).  The factual determinations underlying 
the application of the Guidelines are reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard.  Id.  When a district court employs an 
appropriate legal standard, we will not disturb its determination 
                     
5
.  Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580 (1986), does not require a 
different result.  There, the Court held that a jury-instruction 
error erecting a presumption regarding an element of the offense 
(malice), while violating Fourteenth Amendment, nevertheless was 
harmless error.  Although the jury there was instructed to 
presume malice from certain predicate facts, it still was 
required to find the existence of those facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The Court concluded that a finding of the underlying 
facts there was "functionally equivalent" to finding the presumed 
element of malice.  Here, on the other hand, the government asks 
us to assume relatedness from the mere fact that Edmonds was 
found guilty on each of the underlying violations.  This would 
require us to engage in pure speculation -- to impose our "view 
of what a reasonable jury would have done."  Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. 
at 2082.  To do so would impermissibly permit the "wrong entity 
[to] judge the defendant guilty."  Rose, 478 U.S. at 578.  That, 
we cannot do. 
  
of the amount of drugs attributable to a particular defendant 
unless that determination is clearly erroneous.  United States v. 
Nagi, 947 F.2d 211, 215 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
2309, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2309 (1992). 
 
 A. 
 The district court determined that Carlton Love was 
involved in a conspiracy to distribute at least 500 kilograms of 
cocaine and 3 kilograms of heroin.  The government originally 
attributed nine different shipments or requests for shipments of 
cocaine to Carlton Love.  The government now has admitted that it 
has insufficient evidence to attribute to Carlton Love the final 
100 kgs shipment of cocaine.  Our calculations reveal that this 
fact alone will reduce his offense level to 40.  Accordingly, we 
will remand his case for resentencing.6 
 
 B. 
                     
6
.  Based on a cocaine attribution of over 500 kgs and a heroin 
attribution of 3 kgs, the district court determined Carlton to 
have a base offense level of 40 in accordance with the drug 
quantity table contained in USSG §2D1.1(c)(2).  At a criminal 
history category of I, and with a two-level increase for 
possession of a firearm in connection with drug-trafficking 
activities, Carlton's sentencing range was 360 months to life.  
The district court sentenced Carlton to 360 months.  If less than 
500 kgs of cocaine are attributed to Carlton, he falls under  
§ 2D1.1(c)(3), which reduces his base offense level from 40 to 
38, and, with the two-level increase for possession of a firearm, 
yields a sentence of 292 to 365 months. 
 
  
 The district court attributed four separate shipments 
of cocaine to Cora Love.7  Each shipment originated in the 
Philadelphia area and was transported to Detroit in rental cars 
driven by Russell Freeman, Sr.  Cora Love was among those who met 
Freeman, Sr. at a Detroit hotel at the end of each of these four 
trips.  She also was the person who each time paid Freeman, Sr. a 
courier fee.  The government argues that the record supports a 
finding that the first shipment weighed 25 kgs and that the 
second through fourth shipments weighed 50 kgs each.  
Accordingly, it attributes a total of 175 kgs of cocaine to Cora 
Love for sentencing purposes.  Our review of the record has 
disclosed the following evidence with respect to each of the four 
shipments. 
 Russell Freeman, Jr. testified that his father made 
four trips to Chicago in late 1991 and 1992 and that on each 
                     
7
.  Cora Love denies that any of these four shipments should be 
attributed to her, claiming that she was an unwitting courier.  
The record contains ample evidence supporting the district 
court's conclusion that she knew exactly what she was doing, 
however.  She drove a car on four occasions to pick up sealed 
suitcases of cocaine upon their arrival in Detroit.  She also 
handed Russell Freeman, Sr. money for the drugs.  In addition, 
she brought Ekwensi a package of Bounce Fabric Softener sheets 
from the store Cora Love managed so that Ekwensi could package 
drug money for transport.  (Bounce apparently makes the presence 
of drug residue on the money more difficult to detect.)  Further, 
Cora Love at one point told Ekwensi, as the two were about to 
meet Freeman, Sr., not "to look too obvious" and to "just look 
casual about it."  (App. at 754.)  We accordingly conclude that 
the trial court's ruling that Cora Love was involved in these 
four shipments was not clearly erroneous. 
  
occasion his father transported between 35 kgs and 50 kgs of 
cocaine.   
 The first shipment -- Russell Freeman, Sr. testified 
that he first transported cocaine to Detroit in December 1991.  
That first shipment consisted of two suitcases.  Ekwensi 
testified that she met Freeman, Sr. upon his arrival in Detroit 
and that she carried the lighter of the two suitcases to the car 
driven by Cora Love.  Ekwensi further testified that "there was 
about 12 keys in one of the pilot cases" (the one she carried) 
and that "[Freeman, Sr.] carried the heavy one."  (Supp. app. III 
at 55a.)  The district court attributed 25 kgs of cocaine to Cora 
Love for this first shipment, and Cora Love does not contest this 
attribution. 
 The second shipment -- The second shipment also 
occurred in December 1991, "just before Christmas."  Freeman, Sr. 
testified that he again delivered two suitcases, although he did 
not state how much each suitcase weighed.  The government 
contends that this evidence, coupled with Freeman, Jr.'s 
statement that each of his father's deliveries weighed between  
35 kgs and 50 kgs, supports the district court's finding that the 
shipment contained 50 kgs of cocaine.   
 The third shipment -- Freeman, Sr. delivered the third 
shipment to Detroit in January 1992.  Ekwensi estimated that the 
shipment weighed "[a]nywhere from 40 to 50 keys, leaning more 
toward 50 keys."  From this, the government concluded that Cora 
  
Love should be attributed an additional 50 kgs.  The district 
court agreed. 
 The fourth shipment -- The court found that the final 
shipment attributable to Cora Love also weighed 50 kgs.  The most 
precise evidence regarding this shipment came from Ekwensi, who 
indeed testified at first that the shipment weighed 50 kgs.  She 
then stated that she lowered the price she charged Carlton Love 
for the drugs after he pointed out that each "kilogram" was 
missing four ounces.  One ounce weighs 28.349 grams.  
Accordingly, if one takes into account the reduction, the 
shipment weighed roughly 5.5 kgs less than the 50 kgs that the 
court attributed to Cora Love on the fourth shipment.   
 The district court thus attributed 175 kgs to Cora 
Love.  Any attribution of more than 150 kgs results in an offense 
level of 38, the offense level utilized in determining Cora 
Love's sentence.  We believe there is evidence from which a fact 
finder, with appropriate findings and explanations, could 
properly attribute to Cora Love either more or less than 150 kgs.  
We cannot, however, sustain the district court's allocation based 
on the current record. 
 Attributing quantities of drugs for sentencing purposes 
is an oft-recurring task for district judges.  The magnitude of 
the consequences that can flow under the Sentencing Guidelines 
from one attribution rather than another make this a very 
important undertaking.  It can also be a very difficult one, in 
  
part because precise drug-weight information is frequently not 
available.  Because the available relevant information is often 
imprecise, the Guidelines recognize that the sentencing scheme 
they contemplate cannot work unless judges are authorized to 
estimate the quantity of drugs possessed or distributed on a 
particular occasion.  See, e.g., USSG. § 2D1.1 application note 
12 ("where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not 
reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the 
quantity of the controlled substance").  We have cautioned, 
however, that the necessity of estimating drug weights for 
sentencing purposes "is not a license to calculate drug amounts 
by guesswork."  United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1545  
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 449, and cert. denied,  
114 S. Ct. 618 (1993).   
 The government has the burden of providing a rational 
basis for an assessment of drug weight and a sentencing court has 
the responsibility of identifying a rational basis for the 
attribution it ultimately makes, assuming that basis is not 
otherwise obvious from the record.  In the absence of such 
evidentiary support and an appropriate explanation, the 
Guidelines sentencing process can exact grave sanctions on a 
wholly arbitrary basis.  While a sentencing judge cannot insist 
on being satisfied that a particular weight is more likely than 
not the historically correct weight, he or she can insist that 
the government provide information from which the court can 
  
conclude that more likely than not the historically correct 
weight equaled or exceeded the weight attributed.  See Paulino, 
996 F.2d at 1545 (stating that "the sentencing court must 
carefully scrutinize the government's proof to ensure that its 
estimates are supported by a preponderance of the evidence"); see 
also United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 998 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(same). 
 When a law enforcement officer or lay person familiar 
with a drug indicates that he or she has observed or handled a 
quantity of drugs and estimates that it weighed five kilograms, 
there is a rational basis for the court to estimate the weight at 
five kilograms.  When such a person estimates the weight to be 
between four and six kilograms and it is apparent that he or she 
is simply taking into account that he or she is making an 
approximation, there is a similar rational basis for the court to 
estimate the weight at five kilograms.  But where a knowledgeable 
person provides a range of weights, this alone does not provide a 
rational basis for attributing to the defendant the highest 
weight in that range.    
 Thus, in this case, we do not believe that Ekwensi's 
testimony that the cocaine in the third shipment weighed 
"[a]nywhere from 40 to 50 keys" provides a rational basis for 
attributing 50 kilograms to Cora Love even though Ekwensi added 
the modification "leaning more towards 50 keys."  Nor do we 
believe that Freeman, Jr.'s testimony, without more, can supply a 
  
rational basis for concluding that the weight of the cocaine on 
the second trip was 50 kgs.  As with Ekwensi's testimony about 
the third shipment, a sentencing judge may not arbitrarily select 
the highest figure in an estimated range of weights. 
 Moreover, we believe Freeman, Jr.'s testimony would not 
warrant a judge in assigning the average of 35 kgs and 50 kgs, or 
42.5 kgs to each of the four shipments.  It seems apparent from 
its context that Freeman, Jr.'s 35 kgs to 50 kgs statement was 
not intended either as an estimate of a constant amount of drugs 
transported on each of the four occasions or as an estimate of 
the average weight of the shipments.  Rather, he appears to be 
saying that the smallest shipment was 35 kgs, the largest was 50 
kgs, and the other two shipments were no smaller or larger.  If 
the district court concludes that this is the import of Freeman, 
Jr.'s testimony, that testimony would not justify an approach 
which would merely strike an average between 35 kgs and 50 kgs. 
 There is evidence, we believe, from which a trier of 
fact could conclude that Freeman, Jr. packed his father's car 
with cocaine before the start of each trip and that he was 
keeping track of the quantity of drugs being delivered in each 
instance.  If the district court concludes that this was the case 
and that the import of his testimony was as we have hypothesized, 
we believe Freeman, Jr.'s testimony would provide a rational 
basis for a finding that the total weight of the four shipments 
  
was at least 155 kgs (i.e., one shipment of 35 kgs, one of 50 kgs 
and two of at least 35 kgs). 
 Turning to the evidence concerning the fourth shipment, 
we conclude that Ekwensi's testimony cannot, without further 
explanation, support a finding that 50 kgs were transported on 
this occasion.  Without the benefit of an explanation from the 
district court, we can think of no rational basis on which a 
trier of fact could accept her initial testimony that the weight 
was 50 kgs without also crediting her acknowledgement that she 
was forced to drop the price because each kilogram was missing 
four ounces. 
 As the court observed in United States v. Sepulveda, 15 
F.3d 1161, 1199 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2714 
(1994), a "sentencing court remains free to make judicious use of 
properly constructed averages."  But this does not relieve the 
government of its burden of providing the court with sufficient 
information to permit a conclusion that the average more likely 
than not is equal or less than the historically accurate weight 
of the drugs attributable to the defendant.  While we believe it 
may be possible to conclude from this record that, more likely 
than not, the four shipments totalled in excess of 150 kilograms, 
that conclusion would have to be based on factual findings that 
the district court has yet to make.  Accordingly, we will remand 
Cora Love's case to the district court for more fact finding and 
possible resentencing. 
  
 
 IV. 
 On August 12, 1992, FBI agents attempted to arrest 
Carlton Love at his residence in an apartment complex on 
Riverside Drive in Southfield, Michigan, pursuant to an arrest 
warrant.  The warrant application was supported by an affidavit 
that summarized the results of the FBI's six months of 
investigation.  That affidavit provided information about thirty-
one Federal Express shipments containing illegal drugs sent to 
addresses associated with the nationwide cocaine- and heroin-
distribution operation and referred to telephone conversations 
which had been intercepted in which Carlton Love and Ekwensi 
discussed drug and money transactions.  Included with the 
excerpts of the conversations between the co-conspirators were 
the agent's suggested interpretations of the dialogue, based upon 
his experience and expertise in drug trafficking investigations.  
Based upon the information in the affidavit, the magistrate 
properly concluded that there was a fair probability Carlton Love 
was engaged in illegal drug trafficking. 
 When the FBI agents entered Carlton Love's apartment 
with the warrant for his arrest, they did not find him there.  
They did, however, find drug paraphernalia in plain view.  This 
evidence was seized after the agents secured a search warrant 
based on the information contained in the arrest warrant 
  
affidavit and what they had learned during their visit to Carlton 
Love's apartment.  
 Love acknowledges that "an arrest warrant founded on 
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority 
to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is a 
reason to believe the suspect is within."  Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980).  He insists, however, that the agents 
had no reasonable grounds for believing that he was at home when 
they entered his apartment with the arrest warrant.  He maintains 
that, as a result, the search warrant was invalid and the items 
seized under its authority should have been suppressed.  The 
district court concluded that the agents had reason to believe 
Carlton Love was in his apartment on the morning of August 12th, 
and we agree. 
 The agents' investigation disclosed that Carlton Love 
signed the lease and paid the rent for apartment 1725 at 23600 
Riverside Drive.  The gas service account was in his name and the 
telephone was listed in the name of his mother.  On August 11th, 
a management representative of the apartment complex, during a 
visit from the agents, confirmed that Carlton Love lived in the 
apartment and that he used the black Ford Mustang then parked 
immediately in front of the apartment. 
 The agents asked the management representative to call 
if Carlton Love was seen in the complex.  Later that day, the 
agents were called and advised that he had been observed exiting  
  
his apartment and departing the area.  Thus, as of the evening of 
August 11th, the agents had current information indicating that 
Carlton Love was then living in the apartment. 
 The agents came to the apartment to arrest Carlton Love 
at 6:45 a.m., early enough that it was unlikely someone living in 
the apartment would have already departed for the day.  On their 
arrival, they observed the black Mustang parked in front of the 
apartment.  They maintained surveillance as other residents of 
the complex departed for their daily activities.  By 9:30 a.m. 
all of the vehicles near the apartment except the black Mustang 
were gone.  No one had left the Love apartment.  At approximately 
9:40 a.m., the agents entered the exterior door and proceeded to 
the interior door of apartment 1725.  Simultaneously, they called 
the telephone number of the apartment, knocked on the door, and 
announced their presence.  There was no response.  The agents 
"thought that there was a good possibility that [Love] was in 
there hiding." 
 The agents then called an Assistant United States 
Attorney to secure his opinion as to whether they had probable 
cause to enter the apartment to search for Carlton Love.  After 
receiving an affirmative response, they again called, knocked, 
and announced themselves at the interior door to the apartment.  
Receiving no response, they entered using a key provided by the 
management. 
  
 Once inside and not finding anyone in the living room, 
they proceeded to the master bedroom and closet where they 
thought Carlton Love might be hiding.  On the floor of the closet 
was a large cardboard box containing "plastic baggy material" and 
a vinyl case similar to cases they had previously seen used to 
carry three beam scales.  They left the apartment and sought a 
search warrant.  Carlton Love was arrested the following day 
while boarding an airplane. 
 Carlton Love stresses that the last sighting of him 
prior to the entry of the agents had been of him leaving the 
apartment.  In his view, from this fact and the fact that the 
agents received no response to their simultaneous call and knock, 
the agents undoubtedly realized, or should have realized, that he 
was not in the apartment on the morning of August 12th.  In our 
view, while the information available to the agents clearly did 
not exclude the possibility that Carlton Love was not in the 
apartment, the agents had reasonable grounds for concluding that 
he was there.  Normally, a person who is currently living at an 
apartment returns there at some point to spend the night and does 
not leave prior to 6:45 a.m.  The presence of the black Mustang 
immediately in front of the Love apartment tended to confirm what 
one would normally expect and this expectation was not dispelled 
by the fact that someone probably involved in a drug operation 
did not appear when the agents announced themselves at his door. 
 
  
 V. 
 We have considered the remaining issues raised by the 
appellants and have concluded that they do not warrant a reversal 
of their convictions or a change in their sentences.8 
 
 VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment 
of the district court against Theodore Edmonds on the charge of 
managing, supervising, and organizing a continuing criminal 
enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.  The district 
court's sentences of Cora Love and Carlton Love will be vacated 
                     
8
.  Those remaining issues, as articulated by the appellants, 
are:  First, all the appellants maintain that the trial court 
erred in admitting wiretap evidence at trial, alleging that both 
the affidavits in support of the wiretaps and the orders 
authorizing the wiretaps did not meet the requirements of 18 
U.S.C. § 2518.  Second, all appellants maintain that they were 
denied a fair trial because the trial judge persistently 
interfered with and placed improper limitations on defense 
counsels' efforts to mount a defense.  Third, all appellants 
except for Cora Love claim that the trial court erred when it 
instructed the jury that the appropriate measure of forfeiture 
was the "gross proceeds" received by the various defendants.  
Fourth, Carlton Love argues that the trial court for sentencing 
purposes incorrectly concluded that he possessed a firearm in 
connection with drug-trafficking activities.  Fifth, Duncan 
appeals his sentencing, arguing (1) that the district court 
incorrectly attributed a larger portion of the narcotics to him 
than was justified and (2) that the court used the wrong standard 
when it rejected his claim that he played a minor role in the 
conspiracy which resulted in accomplice attribution.  Finally, 
Duncan argues that the district court committed plain error when 
it admitted his co-conspirators' guilty pleas on the issue of 
credibility. 
 
  
  
and their cases will be remanded for further sentencing 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We will affirm the 
judgments of the district court in all other respects.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. v. Edmonds, Duncan, Love & Love 
Nos. 93-1890, 1914, 1920 & 1947 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge, Concurring. 
 
 I concur with the result the Court reaches in these 
cases and with much of the reasoning in Judge Stapleton's fine 
opinion.  Specifically, I agree with the Court that United States 
v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 642-43 (3d Cir. 1988), requires us to 
vacate Theodore Edmonds' conviction of managing, supervising and 
organizing a continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE") in violation 
of 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 1981 & Supp. 1994).  See Opinion of 
                     
9
.  After oral argument in this case Cora Love and Carlton Love 
filed a motion to add an additional issue on appeal.  Their 
motion did not state adequate grounds explaining why they failed 
to raise these issues earlier, however.  Accordingly, their 
motion will be denied. 
  
the Court, Part II, at 7-20; IOP 9.1.  I write separately, 
however, to note that if this particular issue were a matter of 
first impression, I would be inclined to follow the reasoning of 
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 
947-48 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1701, and cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940, and cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1954 
(1992). 
 Echeverri precludes me from following that course.  
Nevertheless, I believe Echeverri can lead to results that are 
inconsistent with the purpose of the CCE statute and does so in 
this case where the jury convicted Edmonds of all the substantive 
counts involved in all of the predicate felonies.  I recognize 
that the district court could have easily avoided the unanimity 
problem if it had not refused to give the jury instruction the 
defense requested on the need for unanimity in all respects 
material to a CCE case, including specifically those offenses 
that the jury believed were "related."  Nevertheless, the Court 
concedes:  "As a matter of logic, . . . the jurors must have 
unanimously agreed [in this case] that Edmonds committed every 
felony in the alleged `series,'" but then goes on to conclude 
this does not establish unanimity on relatedness.  Opinion of the 
Court, Part II, at 11.  I agree with the Court this latter 
conclusion is a corollary of Echeverri.  See id. at 7-20. 
 I am dubitante on the Court's conclusion that harmless 
error analysis is foreclosed by Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 
  
2078 (1993).  See Opinion of the Court, Part II, at 18-20.  
Regardless, I believe the tension, which the Court recognizes, 
between Echeverri and United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85 (3d 
Cir. 1989) warrants reconsideration of this unanimity requirement 
as it relates to a continuing criminal enterprise.  Therefore, 
because Echeverri is a controlling precedent, I concur in the 
Court's disposition of Edmonds' appeal. 
 In all other respects, I am in full agreement with the 
reasoning in the Court's opinion.   
  
 
 
U.S. v. Edmonds, Duncan, Love & Love, 
Nos. 93-1890, 1914, 1920 & 1947 
 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part: 
 I concur in all but one of the conclusions reached by 
the majority.  And while I share Judge Hutchinson's concerns 
regarding the Echeverri doctrine, and believe that the conceptual 
tension between Echeverri and Jackson calls for further 
resolution, I agree that Echeverri and our Internal Operating 
Procedure 9.1, which precludes us from overturning an earlier 
panel's position, constrain our disposition of the present 
matter.  I therefore agree that Edmonds' conviction must be 
reversed. 
 The only aspect of the majority opinion with which I 
differ concerns the decision to vacate Cora Love's sentence and 
remand her case for resentencing by the district court.  I agree 
that arbitrariness in drug-quantity attributions cannot be 
tolerated.  I am also in full accord with the guidelines and 
principles ably set forth by the majority to achieve the 
objective of determining a rational basis on which to predicate a 
defendant's sentence. See Opinion of the Court, Part III.B.   
 However, as I read the record, any appropriate 
calculation of the amount of cocaine attributable to Cora Love 
must exceed the threshold of 150 kgs specified in U.S.S.G. 
  
§ 2D1.1(c)(3).10  I believe that the record provides ample 
support for the very "rational basis" which the majority requires 
in order to uphold Cora Love's sentence.  Indeed, I find that it 
cannot otherwise be read.  I thus believe it unnecessary to 
remand and require the district court to reconsider Cora Love's 
sentence.  For this reason, I respectfully dissent. 
 As is detailed by the majority, the record reflects 
four shipments attributable to Cora Love as follows: 
 
Shipment           Supporting         Quantity - giving 
 Number            Testimony      the benefit of the record 
  (kgs per shipment)   to Cora Love 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
One      Freeman, Jr.: 35-50.       25 kgs 
     Ekwensi: 25. 
 
Two     Freeman, Jr.: 35-50.       42.5 kgs 
 
Three      Freeman, Jr.: 35-50.       45 kgs 
      Ekwensi: "40 to 50,  
     leaning towards 50." 
 
Four     Freeman, Jr.: 35-50.       44.5 kgs 
     Ekwensi: 50 - but each 
     kg was also "short" 
     four ounces, for a 
     total of 44.5 kgs. 
 
      _________________________ 
       
                     
10
.Section 2D1.1(c)(3) of the 1992 United States Sentencing 
Guidelines provides for a base offense level of 38 for "[a]t 
least 150 KG but less than 500 KG of Cocaine...."  With a 
Criminal History Category of 0 and a two-level reduction for 
minor participation, Cora Love was subject to a sentence of 188-
235 months.  The district court sentenced Cora Love to 188 
months. 
  
                Total:  157 kgs 
 
 On my reading of the record, based on Ekwensi's 
testimony, which in this instance is not contested by Cora Love, 
I would attribute no more than 25 kgs for the first shipment.   
 As to the second shipment, I read Freeman Jr.'s 
testimony that "[e]ach trip my father took it was somewhere 
between 35 and 50 kilos of cocaine" (Supp. App. III p. 75a) to 
yield the rational inference, not that there were four deliveries 
ranging in size from 35 to 50 kgs as the majority suggests, see 
Maj. Op. at 27-28, but that each of the four shipments weighed 
between 35 and 50 kgs, a fact which, on the majority's own 
analysis, would result in an average of 42.5 kgs for each 
shipment. 
 Courts have sanctioned the use of averages to compute 
drug weights in other cases.  See, e.g. United States v. 
McMillen, 8 F.3d 1246, 1250-51 (7th Cir. 1993); see generally 
Federal Judicial Center, Guideline Sentencing: An Outline of 
Appellate Case Law on Selected Issues 21-32 (1994).  And the 
majority here so acknowledges.  Maj. Op. at 28.  In this case, 
Freeman, Jr. has testified that each shipment weighed between 35 
and 50 kgs, thereby establishing an average of 42.5 kgs for the 
second shipment, as to which no other testimony was given. 
 Freeman, Sr. delivered the third shipment sometime in 
January of 1992.  Ekwensi estimated that the shipment weighed 
"[a]nywhere from 40 to 50 keys, leaning more toward 50 keys."   
  
Under the majority's own analysis, every reason exists to 
attribute to Cora Love at the least, 45 kgs. 
 As to the fourth shipment, I am in accord with the 
majority's reasoning and the majority's attribution of 44.5 kgs 
to Cora Love.  Maj. Op. at 24.  
 The four shipments, therefore, total 157 kgs, and this 
total is reached without taking into account an additional 28 kgs 
referred to in Count V of the Indictment.  Cora Love was 
convicted on this Count, and the government points out that this 
amount should have been included in Cora Love's attributed total, 
but for some reason was not.  See Government's Letter Memorandum 
dated October 25, 1994, p. 3.  If one adds this 28 kgs to the 157 
kgs noted above, a total of 185 kgs results.  But even if the 28 
kgs are not added to the weight of the first four shipments, the 
total still exceeds the 150 kg threshold of § 2D1.1(c)(3). 
 The above calculations, which comport with each and 
every principle and guideline laid down by the majority, can only 
lead to one conclusion -- that the record, as it presently 
exists, yields a rational basis for attributing over 150 kgs of 
cocaine to Cora Love.  The drug weights attributed to Cora Love, 
giving her every benefit of the record, necessarily exceed 150 
kgs.  This being so, I cannot bring myself to vote for a remand 
to an overworked and overburdened district court so that the 
court may engage in the meaningless task of resentencing Cora 
Love.  This procedure might well entail the taking of additional 
  
evidence and would, at the very least, require additional 
findings drawn from a record which, I believe, just cannot be 
read to reveal less than 150 kgs. 
 I therefore dissent from so much of the majority's 
judgment as would vacate Cora Love's sentence and remand her case 
to the district court for what I regard as a needless exercise in 
sentencing endeavors. 
